The Cyborg, its Manifesto and their relevance today: Some reflections by Sofoulis, Zoë
Repositorium für die Geschlechterforschung
The Cyborg, its Manifesto and their relevance
today: Some reflections
Sofoulis, Zoë
2015
https://doi.org/10.25595/115
Veröffentlichungsversion / published version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Sofoulis, Zoë: The Cyborg, its Manifesto and their relevance today: Some reflections, in: Platform: Journal of Media
and Communication, Jg. 6 (2015) Nr. 2, 8-15. DOI: https://doi.org/10.25595/115.
Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/legalcode https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/legalcode
www.genderopen.de
Guest Editorial 
The Cyborg, its Manifesto and their  
relevance today: Some reflections  
Zoë Sofoulis – University of Western Sydney 
z.sofoulis@uws.edu.au  
Squirming Back into the Cyborg Manifesto 
The mere presence of adoring fans has been insuﬃcient to entice Donna Haraway to visit Australia. Only 
Helen Verran and postgraduates at Melbourne University’s History and Philosophy of Science department 
managed to interest her once in the late 1990s. So as the first Australian with a doctorate co-supervised by 
Haraway at the History of Consciousness program at the University of California, Santa Cruz, I have 
occasionally been called upon to speak when the doyenne of cyborg feminism was, as usual, unavailable 
down under (Sofoulis 2003).  The role of antipodean Haraway always made me uneasy. It is a mistake to 
project patriarchal (and oedipal) traditions of scholarly filiation onto feminists. In my observation, 
feminist supervisors rarely seek to turn out clones of themselves and feminist students do not usually 
aspire to replicate/replace their professors. Like cyborgs, feminist students can be “exceedingly unfaithful 
to” and quite uninterested in their origins (Haraway, 1991, p.151) .  1
But what really makes me squirm whenever I read the opening pages of the Manifesto or am asked to 
speak for its author, is how closely I recognise my (then) self in the feminist, and especially ecofeminist, 
tendencies that Haraway was railing against. In the four-part conference presentation where Haraway 
introduced her cyborg to US audiences, I went first because my view was more standard and even “retro” 
compared to where Donna wanted to take us. For I was one of those feminists reproducing all those 
dualisms of “white capitalist patriarchy”; I was on about the woman-nature / man-machine connections 
and angsting over the inevitability of C3I and the military logics of computing leading to the Star Wars 
apocalypse (Sofia, 1984). I wrote about “bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis … other seductions to organic 
wholeness” (150). With typical postgraduate self-centredness, I paid little attention to Haraway’s cyborg 
while working on my own ambiguous metaphors and myths of high technology and science fiction like 
the brain-womb, the spermatic word, the penis-breast, the cannibaleye (Sofia, 1987). The bisexual /
combined parent figure of the Uroborous, the serpent that feeds and fertilises itself, was one of my 
favoured metaphors that made Donna want to “regurgitate’”. I saw Frankenstein’s monster and the cyborg 
as equivalent technosex fantasies, whereas Haraway placed them on diﬀerent sides of her chart contrasting 
the logics of “white capitalist patriarchy” with those of “the informatics of domination”. 
Haraway’s closely related later essay “Situated Knowledges” (1988; 1991) generously notes it was 
revised in relation to my doctoral work on the metaphorics of vision in scientific discovery. What she 
doesn’t say was that again, I was articulating the kind of position and interpretation that she was critiquing 
and improving upon. In short, I was pre-Harawayan and Haraway was post-Sofoulis . 2
 “The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment.” (180) 
Eventually I found my way back to Haraway, via Latour et al.’s actor-network theory and especially Don 
Ihde’s phenomenology of technology (Ihde, 1990), introduced to me by my (then) postgraduate, Ingrid 
Richardson (2003, 2007). Playing “Donna Down Under” had forced me to reengage with Haraway’s 
work. I had arrived at the History of Consciousness program already interested in the mythic aspects of 
 All page references are to the version of ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ in Haraway, 1991.1
 Our disagreements were merely theoretical. Personally and professionally, Donna has been unfailingly conscientious, supportive, 2
generous, inspiring and congenial.
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high technologies but through Haraway became more intrigued by embodied relations with technologies, 
whether everyday domestic life, or, as I later explored, in encounters with interactive, electronic and 
installation artworks. This, coupled with my earlier interests in myth, technology and the pre-oedipal, led 
to the “Container Technologies” paper (Sofia, 2000), a pivotal point after which my concerns have centred 
on water infrastructures and interdisciplinary approaches to water management.  
Ironic Epistemology 
“Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension of 
holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true.” (149) 
Nowadays, the aspect of the Manifesto that most strongly resonates with me is its ironic epistemology. 
Haraway’s approach helps me imagine a “knowledge ecology” as an alternative to the positivist fantasy of 
knowledge integration into a universal whole: a multiplicity of interacting knowledges, knowers and 
discourses, each with its own partial truths about the real world (Sofoulis, 2015b). This aspect is not 
uniquely Harawayan, but was co-extensive with the approach to knowledge cultivated in the History of 
Consciousness learning community. Group discussions conducted amongst former students held at the 
time of Haraway’s retirement celebrations in 2011 revealed many felt this interdisciplinary program had 
equipped them with interest and skill at identifying and negotiating between diﬀerent types of knowledges 
and epistemologies.  
The Manifesto’s opening paragraph announces its political intentions: to reinvigorate politics not by 
claiming an excluded identity, or fighting a hated enemy from outside, but by blaspheming—deploying 
irony—“humour and serious play”—from within where we find ourselves, including the all too serious 
strictures of US Christian, left and feminist political orthodoxies. The Manifesto aimed to replace political 
correctness with irony. As Hayden White, long-term head of the History of Consciousness program, had 
schooled us all, irony was the “Master Trope”, valued above others because it does not insist on smoothing 
over diﬀerence and assimilating the unassimilable. 
In this epistemological relativism, positivist and faith-based notions of a singular “reality” or “truth” are 
displaced by the knowledge ecosystem notion that every standpoint and mode of knowledge had its own 
partial truths to contribute to accounts of reality. This relativism (or irony) made Haraway, and post- 
modern theorists generally, targets of a counter-attack from advocates of positivist science and sociology in 
the so-called “culture wars” of the 1990s . The idea that reality emerges in interactions between matter 3
and meaning-making activity (call it scientific practice, hermeneutics or semiosis) scandalises those with 
faith in Baconian science and erodes the epistemological foundations of the (old) modern disciplinary 
divide between sciences and arts, facts and values. The positivists and hyperrationalists fear that abandon-
ing sacred notions of singular truth and unified knowledge will enmire us in an amoral orgy of semiosis, 
an excessively generative textuality unmoored from material reality or truth. Such catastrophising is found 
in positivist-dominated fields like water resource management, where there are anxieties that abandoning 
one-size-fits-all, top-down, eﬃciency-driven solutions centred on notions of average individuals, and in-
stead working with models of social and technical heterogeneity, will plunge us into chaotic randomness, 
where anything goes and no control or oversight is possible.  
“[…] we risk lapsing into boundless diﬀerence and giving up on the confusing task of making partial, real 
connection. Some diﬀerences are playful; some are poles of world historical systems of domination. ‘Epistemology’ 
is about knowing the diﬀerence.” (160-161) 
Unfortunately, all too many of us on the cultural side of the culture wars revelled in the pleasures of 
semiosis and interpretive play, forgetting Haraway’s exhortations about the need to take seriously our 
responsibilities for boundary construction and the metaphors we let loose in the world. We helped stoke 
 For example, both sides the Sokal aﬀair directly involved History of Consciousness faculty members, and adversely aﬀected 3
Haraway, the program and its graduates.
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positivists’ fears that an excess of meaning-making would lead to meaninglessness. Unafraid of indulging 
in elaborate textual play herself, Haraway has often been received as a proponent or example of the “textu-
al turn”, when in fact her “material-semiotics” positioned her against it, and the Manifesto reaﬃrmed 
commitments to (a social constructionist version of ) epistemological realism.  
In the 30 years since the Manifesto was first published, notions of complexity have become more 
familiar and make Haraway’s ironic epistemology more legible and relevant. The alternative to the hyper-
rational positivist ordering of truth and knowledge is not undiﬀerentiated randomness but an intelligent 
responsible facility to negotiate across diﬀerent knowledges of complex entities and phenomena and 
determine which ones matter most to guide eﬀective actions (Ang, 2011). 
Cyborg vs Manifesto (Or: Metaphor vs Irony) 
“At the centre of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg.” (149) 
Most readings and quotes from the Cyborg Manifesto place much greater emphasis on the cyborg 
metaphor than on post-dualist, post-positivist ironic epistemology that it figures. Readers can hardly be 
blamed, as Haraway more or less sets it up that way, and the opening and closing pages on cyborgs are 
much more exciting and poetic than many of those that fill out the body of the essay. Even the CFP for 
this issue reflects this tendency. It starts out being about the 30th anniversary of the Manifesto, but ends 
up being about the Cyborg: “what are new feminist observations about it; did if fulfil its promise; do we 
still need it or myths like it?” So compelling is the cyborg as a metaphor—for example, of the utopian 
potential for subjects of/in the informatics of domination—that it overwhelms the tropic work of the 
Manifesto as irony or blasphemy, a non-innocent and reflexive epistemology that acknowledges both the 
relevance and the limits of diﬀerent knowledges and standpoints, including its own.  
The rarely discussed sections of the Manifesto that follow the opening description of the cyborg 
illustrate some of the real-world considerations for a late-twentieth century socialist feminist: the 
conditions of work in electronics factories that replicate international gendered/race/class divisions of 
labour; the claims of marginalised and non-dominant subjects (especially what Sandoval was calling “US 
Third World Women”); developments across a range of cultural forms (in this case, feminist science fiction 
of the 1970s-80s); current political struggles (e.g. in the mid-80s, a resurgent anti-nuclear movement). 
I have read many theses and chapters and articles (almost all by first world women) rhapsodising on 
cyborg subjectivity and the technologies and media interfaces that enable it, but few seem to follow 
Haraway beyond the metaphor, the science and the technology and pay attention to a materialist, socialist 
and feminist analysis of the labour, resources and institutions involved in the production of those 
interfaces and technologies, let alone a reflexive analysis of their own situation. If there is a legacy of the 
Manifesto, as distinct from the Cyborg metaphor, I hope it might be to challenge us to ground our 
rhetorical/political speculations in a realistic and complex grasp of our own conditions of writing/
knowing/living. 
The Euphorics of Impurity 
“Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our 
tools to ourselves.” (181) 
For a creature that is supposedly outside of salvation history, it is ironic (in the Morissettian rather than 
Harawayan sense) how often the cyborg is regarded as a salvific figure. As Haraway hoped, the cyborg, 
with its euphorics of impurity and the non-innocent pleasures of the interface, has indeed rescued us from 
many of those nasty old enlightenment dualisms and dichotomies. 
It’s an exciting moment in a humanities postgraduate’s journey when they make a leap from thinking 
in terms of simple opposites or dualisms, to appreciating how these dualisms construct (and/or decon-
struct) each other, or a further expansion to some more complex post-dualistic standpoint. The cyborg 
figure facilitated those kind of conceptual leaps, preparing the way for other versions of socio-technical 
theory (such as actor-network theory, and more recently, practice theory) to gain a firmer foothold beyond 
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science studies, while providing an conceptual framework for a post-essentialist feminism. No wonder 
many an emergent scholar has fallen upon the cyborg as a figure that promises salvation or liberation.  
The cyborg’s liberatory post-dualist character makes it easy to equate it with other ambiguous figures, 
monsters, the abject, queerness, etc. etc. The cyborg metaphor was taken up as a feminist version of a 
Bakhtinian utopian semiotic fantasy that had been integral to the textual turn: that any figure which 
undoes, supercedes, or liberates us from categorical dualisms is somehow politically liberatory; that 
semiotic monstrosity equals political subversiveness. The Manifesto is not innocent of this fantasy, but it 
also touches on questions about political and epistemological responsibility: what kinds of knowledges 
about whose material lives and aspirations have input into formulating the metaphor? And what kind of 
political work do we want our cherished metaphors or monsters to perform? To whom and to what 
political and material realities are our rhetorical and political plays answerable?  
Breaking the Metaphor Drought 
“There is a myth system waiting to become a political language to ground one way of looking at science and 
technology and challenging the informatics of domination—in order to act potently.”  (181) 
Colloquial Australian speech has no shortage of metaphors and similes—“flat out like a lizard drinking,” 
“Dry as a dead dingo's donger,” “Budgie smugglers,” etc. But amongst the Australian intellectual elite we 
suﬀer a chronic metaphor drought, constantly recycling the few we have come up with (“a fair go,” “the 
lucky country,” “the fatal shore”), importing the rest from France or the US. Is there an element of 
cultural cringe in our preference for using outsourced metaphors as frameworks for interpreting other 
texts? Are we too lazy or unimaginative to stretch our imaginations and invent our own myths and 
metaphors? Could we blame our cultural context? Colonised during the Enlightenment, whose lands and 
peoples have been administered with ruthless and unsentimental pragmatism that allows about as much 
room for poetry as it does for compassion (that is, not much), our nation has valued technological 
innovation and sporting achievement far above social innovation and intellectual and artistic 
development.   
No doubt the cyborg remains relevant as a metaphor for thinking about life in a post-dualistic, post-
modern, informatised, hyper-mediatised globalised and messed up world. Even Frankenstein’s monster 
continues to have resonance nearly 200 years later (Rocky Horror Picture Show being a case in point). The 
papers in this special edition indicate the continued relevance of Haraway’s cyborg metaphor to contem-
porary early career researchers: whether as a source of terminology and concepts for interpreting techno-
logically engaged feminist artworks (Aceves), an inspiration for making them (Helme), or even, as in 
Grant’s nuanced exploration of the limits of the metaphor, a framework for an amputee’s self-empowering 
new vision of her body and prosthesis. The ironic manifesto resonates with the anarcho-futurism of the 
accelerationists (Wilson) and investigations on the borders of art, science and the human microbiome 
(Bates). However, I’d suggest that what is most relevant about the Cyborg Manifesto today is not the 
cyborg figure but the kind of question to which it was posed as an ironic and blasphemous answer: what 
new myths and metaphors can help us frame our political languages and analyses of science of technology 
(and their associated conditions of production) in order to resist domination? 
The cyborg was just one answer to that particular question of Haraway’s. It is up to us to formulate our 
own questions about our contemporary situation and to invent metaphors that answer those questions, or 
at least help us ask better questions. It is not that any free-floating metaphor would do: consistent with 
Haraway’s socialist feminist commitment is the demand that such figures have strong ties to analysis of 
social and material realities. 
In my current reality some of the urgent questions concern a history of national and international 
impotency on coordinated responses to climate change, a disconnect between current ways of life and 
those geoscientists consider sustainable, and the widespread failure of Australian governments to protect 
land, rivers and aquifers and water from the depredations of foreign coal and coal seam gas miners, despite 
vociferous protests and unprecedented alliances between Greens and farmers. 
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These times call for their own metaphors. For example, in thinking about the temporality of the 
Anthropocene, and our current life in the unfolding climatic and environmental aftereﬀects of global 
resource exploitation, fossil fuel burning, habitat destruction, and loss of biodiversity, I have started to 
explore the zombie as a figure of “the aftermath”: of life going on in an damaged and imperfect world, in 
damaged and imperfect bodies. And in view of the dislocation between many contemporary industrial, 
agricultural and resource management practices and the actual and sustainable carrying capacity of the 
planet, and calculations that we currently consume 1.5 Earths’ output per year on Earth—estimated to 
rise to three Earths by 2030 without drastic reductions in resource consumption —the figure of an 4
extraterrestrial might well be an appropriate metaphor of those whose ways of life are not compatible with 
supporting biodiversity on this planet.  
 Science, Technology, Society, Policy: Some Questions 
An ironic epistemology that can hold irresolvable contradictions in mind is not a luxury but a necessity 
when addressing contemporary issues around the social relations of science and technology in Australia. 
For example, there is urgent need to defend science research, universities, institutions like CSIRO and 
information channels like public broadcasters against huge budget cuts imposed by the climate-change 
denying, windmill-hating, coal-loving, and (thankfully) recently deposed Prime Minister Tony Abbott, 
whose successor has the challenge of restoring a twenty-first century orientation against the pull of such 
regressive views in his own party. In tension with this imperative to fight anti-science is the chronic longer 
term need to challenge the dominance of positivist approaches in policy-making across all fields from 
social policy, education, health and welfare through to economics, agriculture, industry, resource 
management.  
The dominance of positivism is a legacy of a colony settled for social and commercial reasons as an 
exercise in rationalist terraforming during the height of Enlightenment optimism in science and 
technology (and before the Romantic reaction against industrialisation had kicked in). Neoliberalism 
(known here as ‘economic rationalism’) gave it an extra boost in the late 1980s-1990s, and was enshrined 
thereafter in the Productivity Commission (see Sofoulis, 2015a, p. 530 and passim.). With a seemingly 
inexhaustible supply of anonymous economics consultants, it evaluates and/or produces policy proposals 
according to neoliberal economics principles that put markets and economic eﬃciency as prime 
considerations and promulgate neo-positivist views of citizens as homo economicus, customers to be 
understood through behavioural economics and population statistics. Unfortunately, Australia has not yet 
seen fit to replace the Productivity Commission with a “Sustainability Commission”, that would evaluate 
policy and development proposals with a view to the environmental and social considerations, not just 
economics.  
Regular pronouncements by top scientists and research policy bodies address the urgent need to 
“integrate” humanities and social sciences with the scientific and technical knowledges that have so far 
failed to solve the complex and wicked problems of our time—many brought about (as Pope Francis has 
recently reminded us) through a combination of hypertrophied rationalism and a diminished care for the 
Earth in service of corporate greed to exploit it. But “integration” itself is a metaphor that implies a pre-
existing and ongoing body into which some lesser body is assimilated. Where positivists dominate, this 
supposed “integration” often takes the form of a predatory act of “incorporation” where the richness of 
humanities and social sciences knowledge is ignored in favour of quantified social data that can be fed into 
the scientists’ modelling software, disappearing without a trace or any discernable eﬀect on the 
incorporating body (Sofoulis 2015b).  
Most Australian scientists and engineers have no training in the history and philosophy of their 
disciplines and do not even know they are positivists: positivist scientific method is simply “method” to 
them. In the resource management field, so assured are many positivist scientists in the universal adequacy 
of their knowledge that they confidently define the parameters of social research, the questions to be 
asked, and what will count as evidence. One resultant fact of research life for many Australian qualitative 
 http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/world_footprint/  4
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social and cultural researchers in traditionally STEMM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Medicine, 
Maths)-dominated fields (including resource management, transport, health and medicine) is being 
obliged to add a large-scale questionnaire into the research design into order to satisfy STEMM experts 
and policy-makers who believe the only knowledge worth considering is quantitative, statistical, predictive 
and “objective”, and who dismiss everything else as “subjective”, anecdotal or a matter of values.  
The political philosopher Boaventura de Sousa Santos warns of these tendencies to produce knowledge 
monocultures through “epistemological fascism” and he bemoans the “epistemicide” (Santos, 2009, p. 
116) or loss of knowledge diversity that results when positivist science and its conventions of evidence and 
reporting take over most fields, to the exclusion of the unquantifiable insights, wisdom and problem-
solving strategies that derive from interpretive and qualitative traditions (see also Sofoulis 2015b).  
It is important to recognise how hard it is for positivist scientists to accept the validity other 
knowledges they have been taught to disparage. An epistemological relativist finds coming to terms with a 
diﬀerent standpoint relatively easy, like a polytheist adding another god or goddess to a pantheon. But the 
positivist is more like a fundamentalist monotheist for whom accepting another deity is apostasy: it 
shatters their established identity. A Harawayan question here might be: what figures, metaphors or 
narratives could help (and are already helping) positivist scientists become post-positivists who are open to 
accepting other kinds of evidence and knowledges that can’t be presented in statistical tables and charts? 
One key to this answer has to do with replacing positivist arrogance with post-positivist humility.  
The metaphor of a knowledge ecosystem or knowledge ecology is posited as one alternative to positivist 
dominance and “integration”. In a healthy knowledge ecosystem, predation and incorporation of less 
prestigious knowledges is not the only possible relationship. Diﬀerent knowledges (and communities of 
knowers) can co-exist with each other in more cooperative and synergistic ways without needing to lose 
distinctiveness by being dissolved into the (pseudo-)universal epistemology of positivism.  
A troubling feature of the relations between science, policy and society in Australia can be characterised 
by the metaphor of the eternal triangle, where classically A desires B who desires C, who desires A. In our 
tragic triangle, the people (A) look to governments (B) for leadership and decisive action on big issues like 
climate change, fossil fuel dependence and sustainability. In turn, the governments look to scientists (C) 
to tell them what to do, and seek to avoid political controversies by developing a series of technocratic 
processes that address the scientific issues (typically, environmental risks). But the positivist scientists have 
been trained to ignore the social and political contexts of their practice, and to think of themselves as 
disinterested and objective agents with no particular values or responsibility for how their knowledge is 
applied and used in politics and society. Having painted themselves into this corner all the scientists (C) 
can do is look to the people (A), and make arguments for democracy, participatory decision-making and 
public science education, on the grounds that if the public is more familiar with science (or the science on 
a particular topic) then it will elect politicians (B) who are favourable to science and will act on issues like 
climate change.  
Meanwhile, between elections, the politicians press on. While drafting this piece, I heard both the 
federal environment minister Greg Hunt and the NSW premier Mike Baird express approval for a 
proposed massive expansion of the Shenua coal mine in prime agricultural land fed by sensitive aquifers 
on the Liverpool Plains. Hunt stressed they were already at stage 16 of a 17-stage technocratic process of 
scientific review, the final of which was state approval. Baird, whose government is stage 17, referred to the 
panels of scientific experts and the “smartest people” who had been brought into assess it and impose strict 
environmental conditions. “The science was in” he resignedly proclaimed, implying that despite being the 
premier of Australia’s most populous state, as a non-scientist he was powerless to dispute their conclusions 
that the risks feared by farmers and environmental advocates were exaggerated. There was no 
acknowledgement of the incapacity of mining and hydrological scientists to research, report on, or make 
recommendations about the real source of controversy here: the clash of values between those who want to 
preserve the state’s foodbowl and secure pure water for generations to come, versus those who want to 
extract and profit from 30 years worth of coal exports to China despite the potential risks. “The 
science” (which any actual scientist will tell you is never all “in”) and technocratic procedures (such as 
environmental impact assessments) are being deferred to as excuses for government failures to deal with 
the politics of clashing values around coal versus land, food and water.  
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This situation leads me to wonder if more change couldn’t be achieved faster if scientists acknowledge 
they did have values—such as in favour of biodiversity, human survival, and the desire to avoid 
catastrophic climate change—and could directly lobby and advocate for solutions that could be put to 
further debate, instead of relying on the public to elect representatives who might, fingers crossed, be 
more pro-science, and whose parties might permit them to publicly say so. Biologists and ecosystems 
scientists, it seems, are free to publicly express love for the critters and environments they study and want 
to help protect, but this freedom to be passionate does not seem to extend to physical scientists and 
engineers. A Harawayan question here has to do with further breakdowns in the old modern fact/values 
divide: how might positivists overcome their pretence that science is  “value free,” positionless and outside 
of politics, and to instead publicly align themselves/their work with advocates for action on climate 
change, fossil fuel reduction, environmental protection, and sustainable city and country lifestyles, 
livelihoods and infrastructures? What myths, stories and metaphors might enable this shift? 
There is increasing and deserved attention to the exciting prospects for engaging ordinary people in a 
range of “citizen science” projects, typically involving low-level data gathering and sorting. But what we 
need more of are “scientist citizens” who are willing to acknowledge their role as members of society and 
use their elite knowledges responsibly and directly for social and environmental good. In the spirit of 
Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto, a complementary injunction for humanities and social science scholars and 
researchers could be to temper the unfettered pleasures of semiosis with judicious doses of materialism, by 
paying critical and honest attention to the material conditions—whether technical, economic, political, 
cultural, geographic or climatic—of our own knowledge, writing and art-making practices. No matter 
from which side we chip away at the crumbling divide between facts and values, humility about the limits 
of one’s own knowledge paradigms, and willingness to appreciate the worthiness of others, are necessary 
for fostering epistemological diversity. 
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